The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera "Tannhauser und der Sanggerkrieg auf Wartburg". by Harmgart, H. et al.
The miracle as a randomization device☆






a EBRD and IFS, UK
b UCL and ELSE, UK
c CentEr, TILEC, and University of Tilburg, the Netherlands
abstract article info
Article history:
Received 5 February 2008
Received in revised form 3 November 2008
Accepted 6 November 2008














In this paper we examine the strategic savviness of the medieval church as portrayed in Richard Wagner's
Tannhäuser. We show that the church employed an optimal randomization strategy based on arguments
of dominance or trembling-hand perfection. Particular attention is paid to the employed randomization
device.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Crimes are committed becausethey promise an immediate beneﬁt.
The law tries to countervail the criminal's incentives by threatening
with deferred punishment and the potential criminal weighs
immediate beneﬁts and deferred costs when deciding about whether
or not to commit a crime. A crucial role in this decision is assumed by
the probability of apprehension. This is different for the sinner.
The (Christian) sinner knows that a punishment is waiting for him
for sure. He will have to endure eternal sufferings in hell and for
normal discount rates this provides strong incentives for good
behavior. However, there is one way out. The sinner can repent and,
if met by a forgiving priest, be granted absolution.
Obviously, both enforcement agencies—state and church—want to
deter aberrant behavior but the deterrent mechanisms are subtly
different for the two. While the state's representatives have to take
action to punish, the church's have to take action to forgive. This
reﬂects the difference between an ignorant state (that does not
observe the crime and has to exert effort to prosecute) and an all-
knowinggod(whodoesnotoverlookeventheslightestmisdemeanor).
Thedefaultsareexactlyopposite.Ifnothinghappens,thecriminalgoes
free, and the sinner is punished. Hence, deterrence is easier to achieve
for the church and one wonders why it would establish an institution
(absolution) whose purpose it is to weaken default deterrence?
The answer is easily obtained and mirrors arguments against the
severest punishment offered by the state, the death penalty (the
materialist's equivalent to eternal condemnation). Sinners and
criminals alike who know that they will suffer the worst imaginable
punishment in any case have no incentive to return to a path of
decency. There is nothing more dangerous than a ﬁrst-time murderer
who knows that he will face the gallows if caught. And while this is
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criminal, a condemned sinner is obviously bad news for everyone who
surrounds him.
1 Hence, both state and church also want to provide
incentives to those who have fallen from grace to behave well again.
This implies that there are two constraints that deﬁne optimal
deterrence. Ex ante, an optimal punishment has to be severe enough
to deter the crime or sin. Ex post, there must be a “way out” for those
who “cooperate with the authorities.”
2 In game theoretic terms the
second constraint can be derived from dominance arguments or the
application of trembling-hand perfection: even with seemingly
perfect deterrence, bad things can happen, which requires optimality
in all information sets.
While the state may have variables to play with to meet both
constraints (because both, prosecution and punishment technologies,
can be incrementallyadjusted), we argue that the church has only one
option to balance the twogoals: randomization. If absolution is always
granted there is no deterrence. And if it is never granted there is no
incentive for the sinner to repent. Thus, the choice whether or not to
grant absolution must be random.
3
This point is nicely illustrated in Richard Wagner's Tannhäuser.
4
The example is particularly intriguing for the randomization device
employed—a miracle.
2. The story and the model
After being disenfranchised from his friends at the Wartburg,
Tannhäuser, a medieval Minnesinger, visits the Venusberg, a place
governed by the eponymous chieftain of sexual pleasure. Tannhäuser
has a jolly good time for a while but then gets bored and leaves. Soon
after being back in the green ﬁelds he happens to meet his old friends
who, not knowing of his sin, invite him back to the Wartburg. Initially
hesitating,Tannhäuserdecidestojointhemonceremindedofhisformer
love, the immaculate Elisabeth. He is greeted enthusiastically (not least
by Elisabeth herself who has missed him badly), and a song contest
ensuesthatistodecidewhowillgettomarryElisabeth.ForTannhäuser,
whoisbetterequippedthanallhiscompetitorstowinthecontest,thisis
decision time. He can aggravate his sins by winning the contest and
marrying Elisabeth without prior absolution, or he can confess.
Given that he is a believer, the implications of not confessing are
obvious and dismal: the unrepentant sinner will eternally suffer in
hell. But what are the consequences of confession? The story has him
walking to Rome to confess to the Pope. But before telling the end of
the story let us try to model the problem. Employing the most basic
structure we can model the game between Tannhäuser and the Pope
like this:
Stage 1 Tannhäuser decides about whether to sin or not. Sinning—
visitingtheVenusberg—promisessubstantialimmediategratiﬁcation.
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Stage 2 (that is only reached if Tannhäuser has sinned in Stage 1):
Tannhäuser has to decide whether to confess or not. Deciding not
to confess will bring him on a straight path to hell.
Stage 3 (that is only reached if Tannhäuser has confessed in Stage
2): The church decides about whether to grant absolution or not.
Once Stage 3 is reached the church should always prefer granting
absolution to not to—simply because this ensures that the sinner has
an incentive not to continue with his aberrant lifestyle. Hence,
without commitment there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome. Anticipating that he will be granted absolution Tannhäuser
will decide to go to the Venusberg for a while and then repent
(rationally expecting absolution later on). This gives him both, the
immediate pleasure and a stab at eternal life in heaven. Consequently,
the church has to commit itself in order to achieve deterrence and
given the church's rigid structures it seems reasonable that it can
indeed commit to an absolution strategy for Stage 3. Essentially, this
means adding a Stage 0 to the game and dropping Stage 3.
Stage 0 The church commits itself to an absolution strategy, i.e., it
chooses a probability p ∈ [0,1] with which it grants absolution to a
sinner who confesses in Stage 2.
6
What are Tannhäuser's payoffs in this game? There are four
possible outcomes:
1. He does not sin, a boring but safe outcome that gives him a payoff
that we normalize to zero.
2. He decides to sin, gains the immediate pleasure in the Venusberg,
repentsandisgrantedabsolution—clearly,thebestpossibleoutcome
that gives him a strictly positive payoff we denote by b (N0).
3. He gains the immediate pleasure, decides not to repent and suffers
in hell; a bad outcome that we normalize to −1.
4. He gains the immediate pleasure, repents, but is not granted abso-
lution;anoutcomeevenworsethanthelastbecausehehastobearthe
costs of atonement without getting any beneﬁt. We denote the payoff
in this case by −1−c with cN0 denoting the costs of atonement.
Assumingthateternal pains in hell arecomparativelylargewe take
it for granted that both b and c are comparatively small. The church
can now analyze Tannhäuser's decision problem and then decide on
an optimal absolution strategy. From our previous discussion it is clear
that, ﬁrst of all, the church wants to induce incentives for Tannhäuser
not to sin. This obviously requires that absolution is not granted too
easily and could, in fact, be achieved by never granting absolution.
More generally, however, it simply imposes a constraint on the prob-
ability with which absolution is granted. Denoting this probability by
p we can state the ﬁrst constraint on the church's optimal strategy as




As long as this constraint is met, Tannhäuser's expected utility from
sinning is strictly negative and he will decide not to go the Venusberg—
the ﬁrstbestoutcomeforthechurch(whosepayoffsweneednotmodel
explicitly as only their ordinal structure matters for our main point).
Intuitively,theconstraintonpgetstougherthemorepleasurablethesin
(thehigherb)andthesmallerthecostsofatonement(thesmallerc).The
default, p=0, always meets the constraint and would be a good solution
if the church could trust on Tannhäuser not making any mistakes.
However, with the slightest “trembles”, i.e., with the slightest risk that
Tannhäuser sins nevertheless, the church wants him to repent. This
imposes a second constraint:




In words, the probability of absolution has to be big enough to
make confession worthwhile.
1 Similar perverse incentives are created by debt overhang, see, for example,
Krugman (1989).
2 A worldly institution that offers rebates to “repentent” criminals is that of plea
bargaining (see, for example, Reinganum, 1988).
3 Notice that the church cannot offer a “reduced” punishment for repentant sinners.
It has only one “big” punishment at its disposal—hell—and this necessitates
randomization. Dante's Divina Commedia, of course, knows different circles of hell,
but for each sin, there is exactly one pre-speciﬁed circle and again there are no rebates.
A couple of hundred years after Tannhäuser's death the Catholic church found, of
course, another way to ﬁne tune its deterrence mechanisms—By introducing purgatory
(ﬁrst deﬁned in the Council of Trent, 1545–1563).
4 For other papers that study literary sources with game theoretic tools, see Brams
(1994) and the literature cited therein.
5 The music as well as Wagner's stage directions leaves very little doubt about how
pleasurable a stay in the Venusberg is.
6 Notice that any such p is a pure strategy, i.e., the choice of a particular p means that
the church will randomize with that probability for sure.







Thus, there is an entire range of strategies fulﬁlling the two
constraints, all of which involve randomization. Assuming that b and c
arefairlysmall, the rangeis ratherlarge. Fora derivation of the optimal
p we would need further assumptions. Heuristically, we might guess
that the church might feel more comfortable to make sure that its
ﬁrst-order target (to deter Tannhäuser from sinning) is achieved.
Hence, it might wish to choose a rather small, albeit positive p.
In Wagner's operawe observe the use of such a small p. To see this,
let us now tell the rest of Tannhäuser's story.
He walks to Rome, always seeking out the most stony paths and
avoiding the shelter of the shadows, as he wants to make sure that the
Pope takes his atonement seriously. Alas, it is to no avail. When the
Pope hears that Tannhäuser has been to the Venusberg he shows his
most unforgiving side. As Tannhäuser reports:
“And he whom I so begged began: — / ‘If you have enjoyed such
sinful delights / and enﬂamed your passions at the ﬁres of hell, / if
you have sojourned in the Venusberg, / then, now fromhenceforth,
you are eternally damned!’ /”
This sounds like p=0 but the Pope continues.
“Asthisstaffinmyhand/nolongerbedecksitselfinfreshgreen,/so
from theburning brands of hell / deliverance can neverblossomfor
you!”
There is still hope for Tannhäuser. The Pope's staff—a piece of dead
wood—has to blossom again. If it does, so the implicit ruling,
Tannhäuser will be pardoned after all.
Of course, the chances of this happening are slim. But, as believers
know, miracles can and do happen, so there is no doubt that pN0. And,
of course, we might already anticipate how the story ends—after all,
what would be the pointof elaboratingon this sophisticated scheme if
it doesn't come to effect? And so it does. With a little help of Elisabeth
(who dies in grief for Tannhäuser) the miracle happens: The Pope's
staff blooms again.
“The salvation of grace is the penitent's reward, / now he attains
the peace of the blessed!”
Tannhäuser dies and goes straight to heaven—a payoff of +b after
all.
3. Conclusion
In his famous book, Schelling (1960) discussed various reasons for
why agents might want to employ randomization when it comes to
threats and promises, in particular, reducing expected costs of
threats.
7 The reason we discuss here, to mitigate the effects of
deterrence and offer the one who has fallen a chance to return on a
path of doing good, is not among them. In fact, we were not able to
ﬁnd any formalized argument of the type exempliﬁed here even
though it is derived easily. It simply follows from invoking trembling-
hand perfection (or requiring dominance) and the observation that
randomization convexiﬁes the church's set of possible punishments.
However, the implementation of the optimal deterrence strategy
requires a credible randomization device. In Wagner's opera we see a
very effective one—the miracle.
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